The Air Accident Investigation Branch has published a report into an accident where a member of Cabin Crew fell from steps whilst closing the aircraft door for departure, East Midlands Airport, 16 December 2024
As the aircraft front passenger door was being closed by the Senior Cabin Crew Member (SCCM), the steps were pushed away from the aircraft.
The SCCM was unable to stop herself from falling into the gap created between the steps and the aircraft. She fell onto the ramp and was seriously injured.
The step removal occurred despite the aircraft door being open and a dispatcher still at the top of the steps. There were multiple dispatchers and ramp staff working around the steps and it was not clear who had responsibility for checking that the aircraft door was closed and steps were clear.
The presence of one of these dispatchers at the bottom of the steps, with another stepping off the bottom meant the ramp staff moving the steps assumed that the door closure was complete.
The process of door closure and step removal had been the subject of a procedural workaround at East Midlands Airport and other UK airports where the ground handling company operated. This procedural workaround had been happening for many years and had not been identified in audits.
Both the ground handling company and the operator took safety action to address issues raised in the investigation.
A senior cabin crew member suffered serious injuries after falling from a Boeing 737-800 at East Midlands Airport last December, when passenger steps were pulled away before the aircraft’s front door was closed, according to a newly published report by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).
The incident occurred on 16 December 2024 as flight G-TAWB, operated on a commercial service to Lanzarote, was preparing for departure. The 52-year-old captain and five other crew were on board along with 125 passengers. While closing the front passenger door, the Senior Cabin Crew Member (SCCM) fell into the gap created when ramp staff began to move the steps away. She sustained multiple broken bones and required lengthy medical treatment
Miscommunication and Assumptions
The AAIB investigation found that although the dispatcher remained at the top of the steps during the door-closing process, two ramp agents assumed the procedure was complete and pushed the stairs clear. The confusion was compounded by the presence of multiple dispatchers in high-visibility jackets, leading ramp staff to believe all ground personnel had vacated the steps.
The investigation revealed that at East Midlands and other UK airports, it had become common practice for dispatchers—many of whom were not trained to operate passenger steps—to assist in door-closing procedures. This “procedural workaround” had been happening for years without being identified by safety audits.
Equipment and Procedures Under Scrutiny
The steps in use at the time were a basic model lacking interlocking safety barriers, meaning they could be moved while the door was still open. More advanced steps with interlocks, already being phased in by the ground handling company, would have prevented such movement.
The AAIB also highlighted gaps in the ground handling company’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Although procedures required checks to ensure doors were closed and steps were clear before removal, they did not specify who was responsible or how checks should be carried out.
Emergency Response Delays
After the fall, the aircraft’s co-pilot radioed air traffic control (ATC) for medical assistance. However, ATC did not initially appreciate the seriousness of the accident, leading to a slower mobilisation of the airport fire and rescue service. The ambulance arrived at the aircraft around 25 minutes later. Although the AAIB concluded this likely did not affect the eventual medical outcome, it recommended that crews consider declaring formal emergencies in such situations to ensure faster responses.
Longstanding Safety Culture Issues
The report noted that despite improvements in safety culture at the ground handling company, remnants of a past punitive approach left some staff reluctant to report issues for fear of blame. Investigators found that staff often preferred to rely on visual assumptions rather than clear communication—a factor that contributed directly to the accident.
Safety Actions Taken
Since the incident, both the operator and the ground handling company have implemented significant changes:
Only qualified ramp staff may now operate or move passenger steps.
Dispatchers are required to attend ramp team briefings and trainee dispatchers wear different coloured high-visibility vests.
Audit criteria have been tightened, with covert inspections introduced to enforce compliance.
The operator has updated its safety manual to require cabin crew to keep both feet inside the aircraft when closing doors.
A cross-industry initiative is underway to explore redesigned step procedures and improved fall-prevention measures.
